Exhibit A

Excerpts of Transcript of September 11, 2017, *Omega v. 375 Canal*, 12 Civ. 6979 (S.D.N.Y.)

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H9BHOMEC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 OMEGA SA and SWATCH SA, 4 Plaintiffs, 5 12 Civ. 6979 (PAC) V. 6 375 CANAL, LLC; JOHN DOES 1 -7 50; and XYZ COMPANIES 1 - 50, Oral Argument 8 Defendants. 9 10 New York, N.Y. September 11, 2017 2:05 p.m. 11 Before: 12 13 HON. PAUL A. CROTTY, 14 District Judge 15 APPEARANCES 16 COLLEN IP Attorneys for Plaintiffs 17 BY: JOSHUA P. PAUL JESS M. COLLEN 18 MICHAEL NESHEIWAT JEFFREY LINDENBAUM 19 DENTONS US LLP 20 Attorneys for Defendants BY: AVI SCHICK 21 KIRAN PATEL 22 23 24 25

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THE COURT: All right. I want to give the parties an opportunity to argue whatever matters they want to raise with regard to Mr. Schick's letter of August 4 and Mr. Paul's letter of -- excuse me, of September 4, Mr. Paul's letter of September 7, and Mr. Schick's responsive reply of September 8.

So, Mr. Schick, anything you want to add?

MR. SCHICK: I'll just be very brief, your Honor. Obviously, there's been extensive correspondence over the last Just to touch very briefly on three points, the first is materiality. There's no doubt that these declarations were material. They were relied on by the Court in its summary judgment decision, which is no surprise because they were cited repeatedly. Over two dozen times the Cole declaration was cited by plaintiffs in their papers. And further for the notion of materiality is, of course, the fact that they were first solicited after plaintiffs received or first drafted -after plaintiffs received our summary judgment moving papers. In other words, in the first week of June, June 6, I believe it was, 2016, we submitted our papers on summary judgment. If one looks at the limited correspondence produced by plaintiffs last week, it reveals that on exactly one week later, they reached out with respect to these declarations. So they, after reading our papers and preparing their response, that they were relevant and material to the response. I'll leave it at that

on materiality. Of course, I'll let them speak for themselves.

There's also no doubt that they were false. I don't think that's in serious contention, and so I'm not going to address it.

With respect to disclosure, there was no disclosure to either defendants or the Court at the August 2 hearing, which is indisputably after Mr. Cole testified. Mr. Cole testified that he advised plaintiffs' counsel sometime certainly before that, and plaintiffs' counsel in their papers say it's in July. But certainly before the August 2 hearing, everybody on plaintiffs' side was aware that the declarations were false. We certainly got no disclosure of that, which would have been useful.

And finally with respect to disclosure, while there was some limited disclosure of the correspondence between the plaintiffs' counsel and Mr. Cole in connection with the preparation of his declaration, the promised correspondence with respect to the Cole -- I'm sorry, with the Yarborough and Stone declarations never materialized. So, of course, we have no way to assess what went on there.

One final point, I'll be done in 30 seconds, which is that I think defendants really approached this letter writing with a great amount of restraint and lack of finger-pointing.

We talk about the evidence, the materiality, and the impact.

It was incredible to receive plaintiffs' response which pointed

fingers at defendants for apparently not uncovering this earlier. In that regard, I'll just note that plaintiffs — or plaintiffs' lawyers were the agents who ordered these reports. They were the agents to whom the reports were sent contemporaneously. They were the ones who supposedly sat down with these reports to craft and create the declarations which turned out to be false. So the suggestion that somehow this is a problem, a mistake, of defendants' making, it sort of boggles the mind, and I think it sort of reveals the mindset here, which is not to take responsibility for that which went wrong.

Just the final ten seconds, which is that, again, if one looks at the summary judgment papers, they cite repeatedly, dozens of times, to the various declarations. They don't cite at all to the reports at issue here.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: What remedy do you want?

MR. SCHICK: Your Honor, we believe that the appropriate remedy would be for the Court to revisit its summary judgment decision as was discussed last week. I think the supposed sales in May of 2012 were a linchpin of the argument in the case, and they're now unsupported, didn't happen. Stone can't testify to the supposed Swatch sales as well. So we think the Court ought to revisit summary judgment.

Short of that, if the Court were to be looking to a remedy short of that, the only thing I think that would even

come close to remedying the harm would be to preclude any witnesses from the firms, either Diogenes or RJA, that were involved in these declarations.

THE COURT: Mr. Paul.

MR. PAUL: Thank you, your Honor. There are a number of points I'd like to address. I also will keep my remarks on the brief side. First issue is materiality. You need to understand that when the defendant filed this motion, they did not have Mr. Cole's affidavit. It didn't exist. The very record that had for three years, they had the reports. They chose to move based on a lack of knowledge, which they felt was legally insufficient to trigger secondary liability. The Court, when you reviewed the papers, I think that it's fairly clear that you acknowledge as much, that the fact that goods were purchased in May of 2012 was not challenged and that the issue was whether or not the knowledge was legally sufficient.

So from the vantage point of materiality, at least as I understand it -- of course, I can't put myself in the Court's shoes. You indicated when we were last before you that you were unhappy -- but from the vantage point of materiality, as a legal matter, I submit that these statements contained in Mr. Cole's declaration, while untrue -- and we're talking about the statements that he purchased -- while untrue and while undoubtedly and understandably makes the Court unhappy and me, makes all of us unhappy that this occurred, I think as a legal

matter, you need to conclude that they were not material to the decision to deny summary judgment.

THE COURT: They're material to the issues that you raised, though, because when you prepared your memorandum of law and opposition to motion for summary judgment, you cited the Cole affidavit, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 9, 12 to 15, 15 and 16. I lost count. It's well in excess of a dozen. But, I mean, if you go through your brief, the pages 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 6, and 7, it's cited repeatedly. I mean, you raised the issue. You raised the issue because in your argument you were making the point that there was continuity in the 375, it continued to violate your rights, and so it's very important to have the May sale. And you believe that, and that's why you cite the — and I certainly believed it because I cited the Cole affidavit three times in my decision. I thought it was relevant —

MR. PAUL: That's fine.

THE COURT: -- including the fact that he bought it.

MR. PAUL: It strikes me that you found it relevant from the vantage point of when I look at your decision at least -- again, your decision -- it appears to me that what drove the decision, what was material, was the fact of the knowledge issues and that the question of whether and, if so, who purchased the watch in May 2012 was not a factor that drove the decision. And if I may, somewhat out of turn, on the issue

of disclosure that Mr. Schick raised, I want to address that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. PAUL: Yes, we learned at some point in July, early August, but certainly before the August 2 conference with the Court, we began to put things together in talking about it with Mr. Cole. I think I explained that. We immediately --

THE COURT: My recollection is you told me that you're getting your witnesses ready --

MR. PAUL: Right, exactly so.

THE COURT: -- to testify.

MR. PAUL: Exactly.

THE COURT: And in that connection, you had them look through their affidavits.

MR. PAUL: Well --

THE COURT: And you learned at that time that what Mr. Cole said in his affidavit was not so.

MR. PAUL: We were interviewing. We were interviewing. I was interviewing Mr. Cole and asking lots of questions and things were not adding up.

THE COURT: Right. Of course, that's a little bit strange, you have to admit, Mr. Paul, because you prepared his affidavit; right?

MR. PAUL: I did. Nonetheless, on the issue of disclosure, we were concerned, and we started asking questions. And we began to put together exactly what had happened. We

consulted -- I consulted, and I say my colleagues and I 1 together, we looked at a particular opinion of the bar, city 2 3 Bar Association, on the question of whether -- we considered whether we had an obligation at that point to inform the Court. 4 5 The Bar Association opinion talked about the issue of 6 materiality, and we concluded then that -- this is immediately 7 before the August 2 conference -- that the information was not material to the Court's decision and for that reason --8 9 THE COURT: Are you saying the association of the bar 10 is adopting an attitude that says catch me if you can? You can 11 submit anything --12 MR. PAUL: I'm not saying that at all, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: You can submit anything you want, and it's 14 up to the other side to find it? 15 MR. PAUL: No. 16 THE COURT: Because in all the cites you made to the 17 Cole affidavit, you never once mentioned his underlying 18 reports; right? 19 MR. PAUL: That's correct. We did attach the 20 underlying reports. 21 THE COURT: I understand that. 22 MR. PAUL: And so --23 THE COURT: And so you said it's up to us then to find 24 that out?

MR. PAUL:

Not at all, your Honor. We're not saying

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that.

THE COURT: But you don't disclose it.

MR. PAUL: Well, we did not understand -- I think it's clear from the record that we've put in front of you that I made a mistake early on in drafting the document and certainly provided Mr. Cole with ample opportunity to tell us that there was something wrong with the chronology. I think that's fairly clear from the correspondence that we've put in front of the Court. So as to the question of whether there was an intention, an intention to deceive the Court or defense counsel, the answer is no. You can see we drafted a document. It turned out that we conflated a number of different documents and identified only one person who purchased, and, in fact, it was somebody else. And we went back at least twice, each time asking the affidavit witness, Mr. Cole, to look at the document carefully, look at his reports, and the like.

So I think that on the question of intent, which seems to be important under the various — if we turn to the various procedural rules on which Mr. Schick relies for the remedy he's seeking, intention is a very important element. Under Rule 11 —

THE COURT: How about indifference?

MR. PAUL: I wouldn't say that -- well, I would not characterize --

THE COURT: You knew, but -- this is an affidavit.

You keep on suggesting that Mr. Cole drafted this affidavit. I look at the papers now, Mr. Paul, and I come to the conclusion that you drafted the affidavit.

MR. PAUL: Absolutely. I think that's -- we have not -- I drafted the initial draft. I think that that is clear from the papers that we put in. We also --

THE COURT: On the other hand, when Mr. Cole signs the affidavit that it's true and correct under penalty of perjury, he's adopting that as his own testimony, and it's submitted as sworn testimony to convince the judge about arguments that you're making. I think that that's material, and I also think that because you knew but didn't disclose, that that is significant.

MR. PAUL: No, your Honor, first of all, I'm -- I mean, respectfully, I disagree with you on the question of knowledge and not disclosing. If you look, there's a July 17, 2017, email. I'm looking at the transmittal emails, my emails with Mr. Cole: "Please review the attached draft and let me know if it is accurate or if you would like to make any changes."

Looking at the next email, July 18, Paul to Cole: "Please review the attached redline carefully. If you have questions or concerns of any sort, please call me."

THE COURT: We also know from looking at Mr. Cole's letters that he responded, No, it seems fine to me, 28 minutes

later, which suggests that he didn't read it.

MR. PAUL: That's not what I took, and I certainly —
THE COURT: It's a seven-page affidavit, and he reads
it and comes back and says no problem, when the fact of the
matter is you communicated with him before, were suggesting
various things, like Chinatown is a known place for
counterfeiting. And you look at that paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 in
the affidavit, of his affidavit —

MR. PAUL: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- you're the sole and exclusive draftsman of that because when he was asked about it, he said: I didn't draft that. I didn't know anything about it. That's his deposition testimony.

MR. PAUL: I have to go to his deposition testimony. I will tell you that I have had a number of discussions with him over the course of this investigation and other projects that he's worked with us on, and this is not a statement that I make up. This is something that he has expressed to us, and certainly — and, again, I don't have the deposition testimony in front of me. So I don't think that you can — that the Court can really conclude that this was a willful or a — or anything other than a careless, perhaps careless, statement or putting out incorrect facts to the Court.

Certainly, there was no effort made to hide what we were doing, what the facts were. If there were an intention to

conceal, we of course would not have attached the reports.

Now, I'm not saying that we attached the reports in order to reveal something that we knew. That would be bad advocacy, and that's not something that I would do. I realize I'm not testifying under oath, but I'm telling you, as an officer of the court, it's not something that I would do and it's not how I would communicate with the Court. I've been practicing too long and too successfully to communicate with the Court in that way.

You look like you want to say something.

THE COURT: No, I don't want to say anything. I guess when you look at the affidavit the way it was drawn, you look at your argument in the brief, "third parties' use of property as a place from which to sell counterfeit Omega," and you cite the Cole affidavit, the Cole affidavit, the Cole affidavit, the Cole affidavit.

There's another place where you talk about ubiquitous counterfeiting problems on Canal Street. Starts out, "The area surrounding Canal Street has long been a haven for people who distribute counterfeit knockoffs." If you look at the Cole affidavit, that's exactly what he says at paragraph 4 and 5. There's no distinction between what Cole says in his affidavit and what you say in the brief, which indicates to me, as you've already admitted, that you drafted the affidavit.

I think that, with all due respect, Mr. Paul, you're

responsible for the substantial inaccuracy that says he bought the watch, he had a conversation with the clerk. That's all portrayed as the first person. It turns out to be it's false. And then further, you knew about it, and you didn't disclose it. So I don't see how you can say anything other than you intended to do this or you're so indifferent to what it was that you didn't care to disclose it. It should have been disclosed.

MR. PAUL: I'll say just a few more words. I respectfully disagree with your Honor.

THE COURT: You can disagree with --

MR. PAUL: If I may -- excuse me. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: You can disagree with me. On the other hand, I've got to decide.

MR. PAUL: Of course. So let me just make two brief points before I sit down. If you are considering, the Court is considering, issuing Rule 11 sanctions, then I would ask that I be accorded the procedural protection of an order to show cause or, because certainly Mr. Schick did not write a motion specifically addressing this point, I will retain counsel and I will defend myself. In fact, I have retained counsel because I took your words very seriously, and if you're going to consider Rule 11, I would like the opportunity to put together a defense with counsel.

THE COURT: Mr. Schick, you want to be heard on that?